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ABSTRACT 
This MBA Project investigates the use of unmanned 
vehicles, specifically the Navy-Unmanned Combat Air System 
(N-UCAS), which can be employed and deployed in novel ways 
to gain access in the access denied surface domain due to 
the proliferation of anti-ship ballistic missiles.  The 
capabilities of N-UCAS, coupled with a new 
employment/deployment model, have the potential to allow 
the Navy to maintain the forecasted capacity of the future 
power projection fleet while reducing the number of 
carriers.  The savings from the reduction in the carrier 
fleet could allow smaller crafts, such as the Joint High 
Speed Vessel (HSV) and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), to 
be procured in larger numbers to aid in the shortfalls that 
the current Naval Force has in Maritime Security and 
Cooperative Engagement (MSCE) capacity.  
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I. THE NAVY IS ABOUT SEA CONTROL  
Looking to the future, the Navy is clearly 
evolving from being a platform centric to a 
network centric force.1 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Navy (USN) has developed a Maritime 
Security Strategy (MSS) that outlines the Range of Military 
Operations (ROMO) based on core capabilities.  The core 
capabilities can be broken down into three subsets:  
Maritime Security and Cooperative Engagement (MSCE), Power 
Projection, and Access Generation.2  The Carrier Strike 
Group (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) can 
accomplish the Power Projection roles for the USN, but the 
threat has changed.  By attacking the USN at the "low" and 
"high" ends of warfare, (from Maritime Operations Other 
Than Warfare (MOOTW) to Major Combat Operations (MCO)) the 
enemy has created a capacity shortfall for the USN in MSCE 
and a capability gap in access generation.  The aircraft is 
the cornerstone of the USN's power projection and center of 
credible combat force, but the increasing life cycle costs 
have created both the aforementioned issues.  The addition 
                     
1 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power at the Dawn of A New Century (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation National Defense Research Institute, 
2005), 96. 
2 Access Generation and Power Projection have been separated out as 
opposed to coupled due to the proliferation of anti-ship ballistic 
missiles.  This proliferation has caused the surface domain to be 
denied to the carrier.  The Navy must regain access of the surface 
domain by using the domains that are not denied, such as undersea and 
the air.  The MSS outlines Sea Control and preventing war as core 
capabilities, but these are strategic imperatives and are necessary for 
the Navy to accomplish all of the other core capabilities. 
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of the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS) provides a 
possible solution for meeting the capability gaps in access 
generation while providing new employment/deployment models 
for air wings and aircraft carriers that could reduce the 
needed number of carriers to project power—allowing the 
funding necessary to increase the capacity of the fleet to 
perform MSCE.  
N-UCAS is a carrier air wing capable unmanned aerial 
vehicle.  The UCAS is in the advanced capability and 
prototype development phase under BA-7 for Research, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E).   
The Navy Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAS) 
designed for autonomous launch and recovery as 
well as operations in the Carrier Control Area 
(CCA), is comprised of a Low Observable (LO) 
planform Air Vehicle Segment, a Mission Control 
Segment (MCS) and a government led Aircraft 
Carrier Integration Segment.  The scope of the 
Navy UCAS effort includes design, development, 
integration, and validation of an unmanned, LO 
planform Air Vehicle Segment and MCS in the land-
based and shipboard environments. Evaluations 
will be conducted to investigate MCS interfaces 
with shipboard systems such as primary flight 
control (PRI-FLY) displays, Landing Safety 
Officer (LSO) displays, and Carrier Air Traffic 
Control Center (CATCC) stations.  The Navy UCAS 
program will be structured to match program 
resources to United States Navy (USN) 
objectives/constraints with the goals of 
identifying and maturing critical technologies 
and reducing the risk of carrier integration of a 
UCAS.  In previous budget requests, separate 
Project Units were identified for the Navy UCAS 
CV-Demo (PU 3178) and Technology Maturation (PU 
3191) efforts. Candidate Technology Maturation 
efforts include transformational communications, 
advanced integrated propulsion, CV suitable 
materials, LO sensors and apertures, sense and 
avoid functionality (all operating in a LO 
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environment), autonomous operations (software 
algorithms and interfaces), and computer resource 
data storage and access systems.  The 
demonstration and the technology maturation 
efforts will develop data to support a follow-on 
acquisition milestone decision. The Navy has 
consolidated Project 3191 into Project 3178 
beginning in FY10.3  
The thesis will examine the ability to complement the 
air wing with the use of N-UCAS in both strike and ISR 
missions. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The development of the aircraft carrier extended the 
reach of combat aircraft in WWII achieving a goal that has 
only been surpassed by the development of ballistic 
missiles.  "The carrier revolution greatly increased the 
range over which naval forces could deliver combat power."4  
The aircraft carrier development gave the United States a 
means to accomplish the ROMO of the time:  fleet defense, 
land strikes, close support of ground troops, and anti-
submarine warfare.  Once the capability was developed the 
need for range became a strategic imperative for nations 
through the Cold War.  The race for reach had begun. 
At the end of WWII, the United States operated 99 
carriers, including 28 fleet carriers and 71 CVEs.  Within 
five years of the ascension to power, the carrier fleet was 
                     
3 Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Defense Budget 
Materials, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
FY2009,” Department of Defense, 
mhttp://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/index.html 
(accessed July 21, 2009). 
4 Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, 
and Networking: The Case for Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Air System 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 
2008), 30. 
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reduced to 11 carriers and four escort carriers.5  The 
reduction in the carrier fleet lead to a noticeable range 
disadvantage over land-based aircraft, which led to the 
development of longer-range carrier based aircraft.  At the 
conclusion of WWII and the Korean War, the Navy began to 
develop long-range aircraft for carrier-based operations.  
The development of the atomic bomb was thought to change 
the prevention of war aspect that the Navy pursued, but the 
threat of the atomic bomb was not enough.  The Navy was 
procuring aircraft based on atom bomb deterrence and 
delivery but attention was diverted from the need for 
conventional strike and fighter capability in carrier based 
aircraft. 
Fighter aircraft were altered to include interception 
aircraft and long-range strike aircraft, such as the A-6 
and F-4.  During the Vietnam War, the United States 
realized a need to redevelop the fighter air wing for 
carrier based operations.  The limited size of the carrier 
deck and the weight restrictions, due to the catapult 
system and supersonic speeds, have both limited the range 
of fighter and strike aircraft.  Table 1 summarizes United 
States aircraft development from WWII through the 1990s.  
 
 
                     
5 Naval Historical Center, "U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1945–
1950," Department of the Navy, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-4.htm#1945 (accessed June 21, 
2007). 
 5

















The proliferation of the anti-ship ballistic missile 
has created a new threat for the aircraft carrier. Ehrhard 
and Work state, "The offensive and defensive power of an 
aircraft carrier derives from its aircraft.  Without its 
embarked air wing, a carrier is bereft of combat power and 
is little more than a large, defenseless target."7  A new 
technology has reduced the effectiveness of an old 
capability.  The aircraft carrier can no longer enter an 
effective combat radius to deliver time sensitive strikes 
without itself being vulnerable—the vulnerability of the 
carrier has surpassed the effectiveness.  To enable the 
carrier with a capability of long-range strike, the air 
wing must once again be complemented with longer range 
strike aircraft.  Without an air wing capable of conducting 
strike operations outside the known threat radius:  
                     
6 Ehrhard and Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking, 95. 
7 Ehrhard and Work, Range, Persistence, Stealth, and Networking, 45. 
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The CSG is, remarkably, a construct that can 
operate effectively only in a permissive 
environment, or be committed to an anti-access 
environment only under the most extreme 
conditions when national interests compel 
leadership to risk what amounts to a significant 
percentage of the Navy's annual budget in a 
single engagement.8 
Although the MSS outlines the six core capabilities of 
the Navy, the Navy is first and foremost about Sea Control.  
Sea Control is one of the six core capabilities, but the 
Navy could not perform a single one without Sea Control.  
In his book The Next 100 Years, George Friedman commented: 
[T]he single most important geopolitical fact in 
the world [is] the United States controls all of 
the world's oceans.  No other power in history 
has been able to do this.  And that control is 
not only the foundation of America's security but 
also the foundation of its ability to shape the 
international system...At the end of the day, 
maintaining its control of the world's oceans is 
the single most important goal for the United 
States geopolitically.9   
To maintain Sea Control while meeting the current and 
future threats in the globalized world, the Navy must 
perform MSCE and work towards the 1000 ship Navy.10  With 
the addition of brown and green water ships, coupled with 
forward deployment, the USN will reach out to partnership 
nations, develop lasting relationships and train the 
indigenous forces in Maritime Security. 
                     
8 Jon Hussman, "Buy Ford, Not Ferrari." U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings 135, no. 4, (April 2009): 2. 
9 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years (New York: Doubleday, 2009) 42–
45. 
10 Michael G. Mullen, Testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2007.  
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According to Mark Pratt, "During the QDR, the Navy 
developed a new fleet target of 313 ships, including a 
requirement for 11 aircraft carriers—all nuclear powered—
and ten aircraft carrier wings."11  Hussman has explained, 
"Step one is to abandon the idea of a Navy built around 11 
or 12 carrier strike groups."12  The capability gained from 
the addition of N-UCAS, specifically the 1500 nm unrefueled 
combat range, the 3500+ nm ferry range, and the 50-hour 
flight times, to the fleet will allow for alterations in 
the employment and deployment of air wings and aircraft 
carriers.13  A comparison of N-UCAS to the current aircraft 
can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Future Air Wing Capabilities14 
   Max  Flight  Payload  Approach  Combat  Ferry  
Aircraft 
Type  Speed  Endurance  Capacity  Speed  Radius  Range 
N‐UCAS  500kts  50 hrs  4500lbs  125kts  1500nm  3500+nm 
                    
JSF  Mach1.6  10 hrs  8000lbs  125kts  590nm  700+nm 




1.6  10 hrs  8000lbs  125kts  945nm  1275nm 
                    
Growler 
Mach 
1.6  10 hrs  8000lbs  125kts  945nm  1275nm 
                    
E‐2D  325kts  10 hrs  N/A  103kts  N/A  1541nm 
                     
11 Mark Pratt, "Kennedy Warship Makes Last Port Call in Boston," 
Associated Press (March 1, 2007), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,255655,00.html (accessed on March 
21, 2007). 
12 Hussman, "Buy Ford, Not Ferrari." 
13The ferry range is a range the aircraft can travel without a 
weapons load. 
14 “Aircraft,” Jane's Fighting Ships, March 2009; N-UCAS 
http://www.northropgrumman.com (accessed July 15, 2009). 
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Through the new employment/deployment model, it is 
possible that fewer aircraft carriers will be needed to 
deliver the same power projection capacity that is 
available today while increasing the fleet's capability to 
generate access.  The reduction in aircraft carriers could 
free up funding to allow for the procurement of vessels and 
systems able to meet the capacity shortfall of performing 
MSCE. 
C. FORCE STRUCTURE 
Samuel Huntington suggested:  
A military service may be viewed as consisting of 
a strategic concept which defines the role of the 
service in national policy, public support which 
furnishes it with the resources to perform this 
role, and organizational structure which groups 
the resources so as to implement most effectively 
the strategic concept.15   
Huntington saw the Navy’s purpose and role in carrying 
out national policy as utilizing its command of the sea to 
prevent war, maintain America's power along the littorals, 
and achieve supremacy on the land.  The Navy’s role in 
carrying out national policy has not changed significantly 
since 1954.  While Navy planners and budgeters have 
traditionally focused on the importance of winning the 
nation's wars, the Navy's role in preventing wars and 
disruptions to the global commons (including space and 
cyberspace) has made it indispensible to the security and 
prosperity of the nation.  There is a compelling argument 
that "the Navy’s commitment to protecting the homeland and 
                     
15 Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, no. 5 (1954). 
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winning our Nation’s wars is matched by a corresponding 
commitment to preventing war.”16  The ability of a nation to 
prevent war is inherent in the strategy set forth by the 
policy makers.  The construction of the MSS outlines the 
need for the Navy to develop a means to operate in the ROMO 
(meeting capability challenges in access generation and 
capacity problems in MSCE), while constraining the budget.17 
The MSS outlined the core capabilities that must be 
performed to accomplish the Navy's strategic goals.  The 
geo-political atmosphere has changed in the past 50 years, 
exposing new threats in a new environment.  To meet these 
goals, the Navy must operate in all environments 
(permissive, contested, and denied) while dealing with 
threats from irregular warfare to MCO's.  The proliferation 
of technology has made it possible for adversaries to deny 
the United States in some domains.18  These changing threats 
and environments have started attacking the ability of the 
traditional CSG/ESG force structure's capability to 
generate access and capacity to perform MSCE in the global 
commons.  A new force structure, reorganizing the 
traditional unit of issue, concentrating on capability-
based constructs will enable the Navy to operate 
effectively in the global commons, maintain global trade, 
defend the homeland, and remain capable of winning wars. 
                     
16 James T. Conway, Gary Roughhead, and Thad W. Allen, A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
the Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, 2007). 
17 Chas Richard et al., "Dispersed Distributed, and Disaggregated," 
(unpublished white paper, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies 
Group, Newport, RI, 2009). 
18 The denial of the USN in all domains (cyber, space, air, land, 
sea, and undersea) would be a complete loss of sea control, with no way 
to regain access. 
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The future Navy will look different from today's Navy.  
The Global force lay down will be accomplished by 
distributing capabilities that are tailored for the threat 
and environment in the area of operation.  Capability 
matching will replace the current distribution method of 
CSG/ESG distribution. Today the CSG/ESG can disperse 
geographically, but it is limited to remain within 
defensive range of the carrier or concentrate to deliver 
combat credible force.  The ability of a future force to 
aggregate combat credible force through means other than 
geographic (cyber or communications) will enable further 
dispersal of the force. The proliferation of unmanned 
systems will allow the future force to separate sensors, 
deciders, and effectors.  By disaggregating the fleet and 
coupling it with network centric warfare, the fleet can 
accomplish FORCEnet.19 
To meet the goals of the MSS, the future Navy must be 
globally distributed and geographically dispersed.  By 
altering the unit of issue away from the CSG/ESG construct, 
the global force lay down can be constructed around 
capabilities therefore tailoring the fleet to the threats 
and environments in the area of operation.  The dispersion 
of the fleet, while allowing the aggregation of combat 
credible power to occur through communications, cyber, and 
physical means, can achieve control of the seas while 
meeting the goals of the MSS. 
                     
19 FORCEnet is the operational construct and architectural framework 
for Naval Warfare in the Information Age. 
 11
1. Access Generation—From the MSS coupled with Power 
Projection 
The USN has not been denied in a domain in recent 
history, but the proliferation of anti-ship ballistic 
missiles is posing a threat to the carrier fleet.  The 
carrier has a limited ability for self protection and the 
large deck allows for relatively easy targeting in the open 
ocean at ranges that reduce the ability for the carrier to 
deliver the embarked air wing.  To remain effective, the 
Navy must disperse the fleet, increase the effective range 
of the air wing, and regain access to the surface domain by 
using the subsurface and air domains. 
2. Power Projection—From the MSS coupled with Access 
Generation 
The ability to accomplish power projection over land 
is a task shared by all the departments in the military.  
One of the means of power projection is the delivery of 
time sensitive, eyes-on-target strike by the embarked air 
wing on the carrier.  Due to the anti-ship ballistic 
missile threat, the carrier fleet cannot approach the 
effective combat radius in a MCO for the air wing and must 
concentrate the CSG to increase defense of the carrier—
limiting the ability to deliver combat credible force.  By 
investing in longer range carrier based aircraft, the Navy 
can once again deliver the power projection necessary in a 
MCO against a peer/near peer adversary. 
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3. Maritime Security and Cooperative Engagement 
(MSCE)—Coupling Forward Deployed, Maintenance of 
Security at Sea, and Building Relationships 
The traditional CSG/ESG is able to perform MSCE 
operations but has limited capacity.  Increasing life-cycle 
costs do not properly match the capabilities of the CSG/ESG 
with the MSCE operations the force and global commons are 
threatened with today and will be in the future.20  The 
advancement in unmanned vehicle technology has created a 
means for smaller maritime crafts, such as the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) and the Joint High Speed Vessel (HSV), to 
increase their capabilities for Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) and self-protection. By increasing 
the capacity of the fleet to perform MSCE, with ships that 
are more suited to the operations, the Navy will be able to 
match capabilities with the operations while increasing the 
cooperative engagement.  The Navy can aid in partnership 
nations' development to conduct maritime security and reach 
the goal of the 1000-ship Navy. The Secretary of Defense 
stated in a speech at the Army War College, “The black and 
white distinction between irregular war and conventional 
war is an outdated model.”21  
D. THE WAY FORWARD 
The Navy must be enabled to perform Access Generation, 
Power Projection, and MSCE.  The range of the embarked air 
wing will render the carrier fleet incapable of achieving 
                     
20 Expected outcome of the QDR.  
21 Robert Gates, speech, (presented at the Army War College, Carlise, 
PA, 15 April 2009). 
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the above task without support from other assets.22   The 
addition of N-UCAS to the carrier fleet will enable the air 
wing with the capability of access generation in the air to 
regain access to the surface domain.  The capabilities of 
N-UCAS outlined in Table 2 will enable the carrier fleet to 
employ and deploy the air wing differently in the future. 
This thesis will analyze whether the new structure 
will enable the Navy to achieve the benefits of the power 
projection force today in the future while reducing the 
carrier fleet.  A reduction in the carrier fleet could make 
funding available to increase the Navy's capacity to 
perform MSCE.  The capabilities that N-UCAS can bring to 
the embarked air wing will be analyzed to determine if the 
addition of N-UCAS can increase the capacity inherent in 
the carrier to perform the mission sets that the air wing 
perform.  N-UCAS integration into the strike/fighter 
squadron will be the only estimated portion of the air wing 
due to the assumption that the capabilities of the 
demonstrator model will be the same as the production 
model.  Cost estimations will accompany a cost analysis to 
determine whether the addition of N-UCAS can reduce the 
Navy's budget allowing for the funding of MSCE crafts. 
                     
22 The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps are all part of the power 
projection force. 
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II. CARRIER AIR WING OF THE FUTURE: 
EVOLUTIONARY VERSES REVOLUTIONARY 
As the Navy's major power projection element, the 
aircraft carrier and its expeditionary air wing 
are critical to battlefield success, but with 
pressure to cut defense budgets and the declining 
global threat, the USN is rethinking the size and 




The future of the aircraft carrier is dependent on the 
composition of the air wing.  As the threats and 
environments change, the air wing must be able to meet the 
growing expeditionary requirements while projecting power 
from beyond the surface denied area.  The employment and 
deployment of the carrier air wings can be accomplished in 
two ways:  Revolutionary and Evolutionary.  The 
Evolutionary carrier air wing will be composed of aircraft 
that are a continuum of the current structure that the 
Program Objective Memorandum 2010 (POM10) has outlined.  
With the proliferation of Unmanned Vehicles (UV's), it will 
become necessary for the center of the USN's power 
projection to develop organic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
capability and capacity.  The Revolutionary air wing will 
examine three steps of N-UCAS integration to increase the 
capabilities and capacities of the aircraft carrier.   
 
                     
23 Barbera Starr, "U.S. Navy Aviation Multi-Role is the Key to 
Smaller Air Wings," Jane's Defense Weekly 19, no. 14 (2003): 28. 
 16
The current air wing is composed of:24 
 Two strike fighter squadrons of Hornets (10-12 
aircraft per squadron) 
 Two strike fighter squadrons of Super Hornets 
(10-12 aircraft per squadron) 
 One Electronic Attack squadron of Prowlers (4 
aircraft) 
 One Carrier Airborne Early Warning squadron of 
EA-2C(3 aircraft) 
(For the purposes of this study the Fleet Logistics 
squadron and Helicopter squadron will not be examined.)  
B. EVOLUTIONARY 
The future air wing will look similar to the air wing 
today composed of: 
 Two strike fighter squadrons of Joint Strike 
Fighters (JSF) (10-12 aircraft per squadron) 
 Two strike fighter squadrons of Super Hornets 
(10-12 aircraft per squadron)25 
 One Electronic Attack squadron of Growlers (5 
aircraft) 
 One Carrier Airborne Early Warning squadron of 
EA-2D's (5 aircraft) 
The capabilities and missions of the future air wing 
are outlined in Tables 2, 3, and 4.   
                     
24 Lambeth, Air Power at the Dawn of A New Century.  
25 The Super Hornet Squadrons will be systematically replaced with 
new aircraft, most likely JSF, as they come to the end of their useful 
life. 
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Table 3.   Mission Sets for Future Strike Fighter Aircraft26 
Mission  Fighter   Fleet   Strike  Interdiction  Close in  Reconnaissance 
Aircraft Type  Escort  Air Defense        Air Support    
N‐UCAS        X      X  X 
                    
JSF  X  X  X  X  X  X 
                    
Super Hornet  X  X  X  X  X  X 
 
Table 4.   Mission Sets for Future Electronic Attack (EA) 
and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) Aircraft27 
Mission  AEW  CC  Surface  Strike and  SAR  Comms  EW 
Aircraft Type        Surveillance  Interdiction Control     Relay    
                       
N‐UCAS  X     X        X  X 
                       
E‐2D  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
                       
Growler                    X 
 
1. Strike Fighters 
The addition of F/A-18 E/F brings greater endurance 
and distance to the fleet increasing the carriers' 
capability to accomplish air superiority and long-range 
strike from the aircraft carrier.  The F/A-18 E/F also 
brings the ability to act as an air tanker, thus 
eliminating the need for the S-3 on the carrier.  The 
addition of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to the carrier 
air wing will give greater stealth capabilities and upgrade 
the legacy technology present in the F/A-18.  Although its 
capabilities enhance the air wing, the JSF's combat radius 
                     
26 “Aircraft,” Jane’s Fighting Ships. 
27 Ibid. 
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is shorter than the F/A-18, thus reducing the capability to 
perform long distance strikes. 
2. Electronic Attack 
Since the F/A-18 aircraft design is proven and is 
capable, the Growler is made from the same airframe.  The 
Growler will enable the Electronic Attack (EA) squadron to 
have self-defense capabilities and eliminate the need for 
fighter escorts while increasing the EA combat radius and 
enable aerial refueling.  The Growler will be able to 
accompany the Strike Fighter Squadrons in all missions 
because it can match the supersonic speed of the F/A-18 
E/F. 
3. Airborne Early Warning 
The E-2D is an upgrade to the E-2C.  The upgrade will 
include new radar systems, infrared search and track, 
modular communications equipment, multi-sensor and tactical 
glass cockpit, and flat-panel primary flight displays.  The 
aircraft will be able to increase command and control 
functions, air and sea surveillance, and communications 
functions for the tactical commander. 
C. REVOLUTIONARY 
In Skunk Works, Rich and Janos describe a system: 
At the Heart of the system were two powerful 
computers that detailed every aspect of a 
mission, upgraded with the latest satellite-
acquired intelligence so that the plan routed a 
pilot around most dangerous enemy radar and 
missile locations.  When the cassette was loaded 
into the airplane's system, it permitted "hands-
off" flying though all turning points, altitude 
changes, and airspeed adjustments.  Incredibly, 
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the computer program actually turned the fighter 
at certain angles to maximize its stealthiness to 
the ground at dangerous moments during the 
mission, when it would be in range of enemy 
missiles, and got the pilot over his target after 
a thousand-mile trip with split section 
precision.  Once over the target, a pilot could 
override the computers, take control, and guide 
his two bombs to target by infrared video 
imagery.  Otherwise, our auto piloted computer 
was programmed even to drop his bombs for him.28 
At the close of the Cold War, the technology allowed 
for a stealth bomber to be capable of unmanned operation, 
but the systems left the man in the loop for delivering 
lethal effects.  The next step in the evolution of unmanned 
systems was to place the control on a shore base as was 
used in the War on Terrorism at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.  The addition of N-UCAS to the 
carrier air wing is a logical direction for the Navy to 
take.  The aircraft will be capable of performing the 
mission sets outlined in Tables 3 and 4, with the 
capabilities in Table 2.   
As seen in the comparison to the manned aircraft, N-
UCAS is not capable of operating at super-sonic speeds, and 
due to the orientation and decision limitations without the 
human in the aircraft, the N-UCAS cannot operate as a 
Command and Control element. However, it could be used to 
feed information to shore or ship based command and control 
units.  The capabilities of the platform can enhance the 
move towards Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) and increase 
the disaggregation and dispersion of the fleet.   
                     
28 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works (Little Brown and Company, 
New York, 1994), 95. 
 20
The following three models integrate N-UCAS into the 
carrier air wing.  First, N-UCAS will be used to augment 
the Strike Fighter Squadrons.  Second, N-UCAS will replace 
the Electronic Warfare (EW) portion of the air wing, and 
the N-UCAS will replace the E-2D last.  The models are 
developed to replace aircraft as technology progresses and 
current aircrafts are at the end of their useful life.  
Assumptions for the analysis are outlined in Appendix A. 
1. N-UCAS Integration into the Strike Fighter 
Squadrons 
The addition of N-UCAS to the Strike Fighter squadrons 
will enhance the capabilities to perform long-range, 
persistent strike and Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), while increasing the capacity to 
perform all mission sets outlined in Table 3.  The F/A-18 
has replaced the carrier-based aerial refueling planes the 
S-3.  There has not been any replacement to the deck space—
the S-3 was a large plane that took up a lot of deck space.  
Six N-UCAS can be added to the carrier air wing in place of 
the S-3 to allow the manned strike fighters to train and 
conduct continuing operations at sea with N-UCAS.  Although 
only six aircraft, the extensive unrefueled ferry range of 
the N-UCAS will allow the carrier to be complemented with 
an additional 12 aircraft within eight hours from most U.S. 
land bases.29  This will give the carrier an additional 18 
assets to perform strike and ISR.   
                     
29 A new flight deck operations model would need to be developed to 
accommodate continuous sortie generation with the new aircraft, but the 
thesis will not model new flight deck operations. The aircraft carrier 
can accommodate the aircraft. 
 21
The JSF and Super Hornet are both capable of super-
sonic speed, and the human in the loop allows for dynamic 
environment updating for faster reaction time.  The 
technology for dynamic environment updating to the onboard 
computer systems is not yet available to allow the N-UCAS 
to perform as well as the JSF and Super Hornet in air-to-
air combat.30  Once access has been generated and the power 
projection forces roll in, close-in air support can be 
accomplished by the manned or unmanned aircraft.   
The thesis is not intended to argue the legal, 
ethical, or trust issues involved with allowing unmanned 
aircraft to provide ground support to the troops in area.  
The thesis only examines the ability to complement the air 
wing with the use of N-UCAS in both strike and ISR 
missions. 
2. N-UCAS Integration into the Electronic Attack 
(EA) Squadron 
The Growler will be the manned aircraft responsible 
for EA in the fleet.  The Growler has several capabilities 
that the N-UCAS does not.  The Growler has the same 
airframe as the Super Hornet and can travel at supersonic 
speeds, aerial refuel, and provide self-protections, but 
the basic missions accomplished by the aircraft can be 
accomplished by N-UCAS.  This thesis will examine the 
alteration of the EA squadron to include three N-UCAS with 
two Growlers.   
                     
30 The ability for an unmanned system to respond is dependent on the 
sensor grid that the system is networked with.  A capable, integrated 
infrastructure for sensing would be able to deliver real-time 
information to unmanned systems enabling operation in a dynamic 
environment. 
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3. N-UCAS Integration into the Airborne Early 
Warning Squadron (AEW) 
The E-2D is not only able to accomplish the missions 
that N-UCAS can as outlined in Table 4, but it can provide 
overall command and control functions for the air wing.  
The replacement of the E-2D with N-UCAS can be accomplished 
by giving N-UCAS all the sensing and integrating that is in 
the E-2D.  This will allow the command and control 
functions to be accomplished from any platform that is 
communicating with the N-UCAS.  The commander of all 
operations can be on the carrier, destroyer, cruiser, or 
even a submarine.   
Satellite communications are available in the 
permissive environments; but once the environment becomes 
contested or denied, Line of Sight (LOS) communications are 
necessary.  The addition of laser communications to the 
fleet will add redundancy to communications and gives the 
Fleet Commander the option to place the operational 
commander for the air forces on any platform.  The 
replacement of five E-2Ds with five N-UCAS will enable the 
fleet to disaggregate the sensor from the deciders and from 
the effectors.  This will allow the N-UCAS to queue 
ballistic or cruise missiles from other assets, such as 
submarines or destroyers.  This thesis analyzes the 
inclusion of N-UCAS into the AEW squadron. 
 
 23
III. CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY COMPARISON 
More broadly, the ancients understood 
technological progress: For it is a rule that, 
just as in crafts, the new always prevails.31 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The integration of N-UCAS into the future carrier air 
wing must be analyzed on both the capabilities and 
capacities that are enhanced and lost due to the 
integration.  Both the capabilities and capacities brought 
to the fleet from N-UCAS are dependent on the 50-hour 
flight time and internal payload of N-UCAS.  The 
assumptions and calculations used in the analysis are in 
Appendices A and B respectively.   
B. STRIKE FIGHTER SQUADRONS 
The evolutionary strike fighter squadrons can perform 
the mission sets in Table 3.  The addition of N-UCAS to the 
fleet will increase the capacity and capability in both the 
ISR and Strike missions.  The model for the Revolutionary 
air wing will have the same capability and capacity with 
the JSFs and Super Hornets.  The six N-UCAS that will be 
embarked on the carrier will enable integrated manned and 
unmanned aircraft training while increasing the organic UV 
capacity and capability of the carrier. 
                     
31 J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classic 
Antiquity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 10. 
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1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) 
Manned aircraft ISR capacity is limited due to flight 
time restrictions on manned aircraft and due to the other 
mission sets that the aircraft needs to accomplish.  Figure 
1 shows the comparison of the N-UCAS time on station to the 
manned aircraft. 
 
Figure 1.   N-UCAS Time on Station Compared to Manned Aircraft 
The comparison of the aircraft for ISR is accomplished 
by comparing the maximum time on station for a 50-hour 
flight of N-UCAS with a 10-hour flight of manned aircraft.  
As the distance from the carrier increases, the benefits 
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for integration of N-UCAS into the carrier air wing become 
apparent.  Figure 2 illustrates the increase in the 
capacity to perform ISR, in terms of time on station with 
sensors, with the six embarked N-UCAS on the air wing. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Additional ISR Capacity Gained from 6 Embarked N-
UCAS 
2. Strike 
N-UCAS brings a new capability to generate access in 
the surface-denied domain that has grown due to the 
proliferation of anti-ship ballistic missiles.  The 1500nm 
unrefueled combat radius of N-UCAS allows the air wing to 
deliver a time-critical precision strike in the surface 
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denied domain to regain access for the carrier.  A typical 
alpha strike consists of eight to 10 strike fighters used 
to deliver approximately 8000lbs of payload each.  The 
total complement will be 64000–80000lbs of payload per 
sortie.32  The additional six embarked N-UCAS can be 
complemented by 12 N-UCAS from a land base due to the 
unrefueled ferry range of 3500+nm.  The total of 18 
additional strike aircraft can deliver 4500lbs of payload 
each for a total of 81000lbs of payload.  This is roughly 
increasing the capacity of the carrier by one additional 
strike air wing.  It is outside the scope of this thesis to 
analyze a new carrier flight deck operations model that 
will be needed for extended strike missions with N-UCAS. 
The JSF will have new stealth technology to increase 
the capability of the air wing.  The stealth of both the 
JSF and Super Hornet are reduced when they are fully loaded 
out, but the N-UCAS has internal payload capacity allowing 
stealth to be retained.  The future strike air wings will 
still require AEW capacity; but self-protection is organic 
to the Growler, and no fighter escort is required. 
C. ELECTRONIC WARFARE SQUADRON 
Lambeth explained the need to replace the Prowler: 
The Prowler is long overdue to be replaced.  It 
is not aerodynamically compatible with the 
current-generation strike aircraft.  Not only is 
it g-limited, it cannot keep up with a strike 
package of F/A-18s.  These performance 
shortcomings have forced EA-6B aircrews to devise 
                     
32 “Aircraft,” Jane’s Fighting Ships.  
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innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures to 
operate effectively with strike fighters.33  
The addition of five Growlers to the air wing will 
increase the capability to perform strike operations 
without need for a fighter escort or limitations to speeds 
and g-limits.  Altering the air wing by three Growlers, 
while adding three N-UCAS, will reduce the ability for the 
air wing to sortie at super-sonic speeds but will increase 
the capacity to perform persistent EW.  The capabilities of 
the demonstrator N-UCAS do not include parameters for EW.  
To add that capability, N-UCAS will require more funding 
for RDT&E, testing, and demonstration.  Figure 1 compares 
the time on station of the N-UCAS to the Super Hornet and 
the Growler, a variant of the Super Hornet, which is also 
limited to 10-hour flight times.  Figure 3 compares the 
total air wing EW persistence. 
                     
33 Lambeth, Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century, 82-83. 
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Figure 3.   Total Air Wing EW Persistence Comparison Between Air 
Wings 
D. AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SQUADRON 
The five E-2Ds in the air wing will increase the 
capability of the air wing with upgraded technology.  By 
changing out all five E-2D's with N-UCAS, assuming 
comparable capabilities, the N-UCAS will increase the 
capacity of the air wing to perform persistent AEW but will 
limit the command and control functions of the aircraft.  
Although the command and control functions cannot be 
accomplished by the N-UCAS, the command and control 
functions can be done from any platform that is able to 
communicate with the aircraft.  The time on station of the 
N-UCAS is increased from that of the E-2D, as per Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.   Total Air Wing AEW Persistence Comparison Between 
Air Wings 
With the Air Commander on a separate platform, the N-
UCAS can queue (request follow on missile launches) the 
commander to launch subsequent ballistic or cruise missiles 
to targets identified by the N-UCAS.  This function will 
give the commander greater flexibility in the employment of 
lethal force.  The capabilities of the demonstrator N-UCAS 
do not include parameters for AEW.  That capability will 
require more funding for RDT&E, testing, and demonstration.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The capacities and capabilities of the air wing are 
all enhanced due to the addition of N-UCAS into the future 
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air wing.  The limiting capacity improvement is in the area 
of payload capacity—since the additional N-UCAS will 
increase the capacity to deliver one additional air wing's 
worth of strike capacity.  This means that the 
revolutionary air wing will make the future carrier air 
wing the equivalent of 1.5 times the capacity of today's 
air wing.  Therefore, nine aircraft carriers will give the 
fleet the same capacity and capability for strike as 13 and 
one-half carriers without N-UCAS.  Although the capacity of 
the air wing can be increased with the additional N-UCAS in 
AEW and EW, this thesis analyzes the limiting factors of 




IV. N-UCAS LIFE CYCLE COST (LCC) ESTIMATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Approximately one third of what the Navy spends in 
procurement, research, and development on large 
acquisitions is for carriers and their associated air 
wings—precisely those items that N-UCAS can replace at 
significantly lower costs.  In fact, 33 percent of what the 
Navy spends for Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) 
reportable programs is for carriers and the air wings.  
Figure 5 displays the breakdown of 2007 SAR resources.34 
                     
34 The congressional Research Service determined in September 2009 
that 2456 JSF were going to be procured with 680 for the Navy and 
Marine Corps.  Since the JSF is in the DoD SAR (the SAR is broken down 
into four categories DoD, Navy, Army, and Air Force) 28 percent of JSF 
funding was included in the Navy funding. 
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Figure 5.   Breakdown of SAR by Percentage of Total SAR Navy 
Investment35 
B. SCHEDULE 
The production and integration of unmanned systems is 
relatively new with few historical precedents.  We needed a 
schedule for LCC estimation, but the literature illustrated 
contradictory schedules.  A schedule was presumed that 
meshed historical data with RDT&E funding.  Figure 6 
illustrates a Gantt chart similar to the one used in the 
production of Global Hawk.  The Gantt chart has been 
modified for N-UCAS with the assumption that a carrier 
landing will be accomplished as scheduled in 2011.  If 
there are no alterations to the demonstrator model, the 
 
 
                     
35 U.S. Department of Defense, “Office of the Secretary of Defense,” 
U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/osd/ (accessed 
online August 2009). 
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timeline through production will be similar to the Global 
Hawk, and full production can be accomplished by 
approximately 2020. 
 
Figure 6.   Assumed Schedule for N-UCAS production36 
C. COST ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
We developed a LCC estimate for N-UCAS, including 
Research and Development, Procurement, and O&S costs.  A 
summary of our estimating approaches is in Table 5, and 
details of these estimates are in the following paragraphs.  
All estimates will eventually be converted to FY10$, using 
inflation indices from the Naval Center for Cost Analysis 
(NCCA). 
                     
36 Jeffrey Drezner and Robert Leonard, Global Hawk and DarkStar 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002). 
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Structure FY10$M Basis for Evaluation 
Total RDT&E 
Costs   1468 
RDT&E 0604402N, UNMANNED COMBAT AIR VEHICLE 
(UCAV) ADV CP/PROTO DEV 38 
     
Total 
Production 
Costs  5013 
DASA-CE for T1, Standard Cost Factor Handbook, 
Learning Curve Theory 
     
Total O&S 
Costs  16224 Analogy to F/A-18 E/F, Ratios in Table 14 
     
 
1. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
We used FY09 RDT&E Budget Data, available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/ind
ex.html, with the results listed in Table 6.  These data 
are in then-year millions of dollars and were converted to 
FY10$M using NCCA inflation indices in Table 7.  The RDT&E 
of the N-UCAS demonstrator budget covers FY07-FY13, when 
carrier implementation and testing is assumed to be 
completed. 
                     
37 It has been noted that MILCON can be integrated into the LCC 
estimation, but this thesis did not include an estimation of MILCON. 
38 Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Defense 
Budget Materials.” 
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Table 6.   RDT&E Funding for N-UCAS39 
EXHIBIT R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification DATE:   
             February 2008 
APPROPRIATION/BUDGET 
ACTIVITY          
R-1 ITEM 
NOMENCLATURE   
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT TEST 
& EVALUATION, NAVY / BA-7         
0604402N, UNMANNED 
COMBAT AIR VEHICLE 
(UCAV) ADV CP/PROTO DEV 
COST ($ in 
Millions) 
FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013  
Total PE 






D) 97.1 158.2 268.5 269.5 205.1 133.4 85.5  
3191 UCAS 
TECHNOLOGY 




                     
39 Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Defense Budget Materials.” 
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Table 7.   RDT&E Totals for N-UCAS by Year in Millions of 
FY10$ 
COST ($ in 
Millions) 











Cost 97.1 158.2 275.8 315.8 271.9 222.0 170.4
Multiplier 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.93 
Total RDT&E 
Costs FY10$ in 
millions 98.9 158.8 273.4 308.4 261.1 209.5 157.9
 
2. Production 
We developed the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and 
Basis of Estimates (BOE) for the production phase of N-UCAS 
that is in Table 8. 
Table 8.   Work Breakdown Structure and Basis for Estimation 
for RDT&E40 
Work Breakdown Structure Basis for Evaluation 
Manufacturing 
Learning Curve Theory and DASA-CE 
Study 
Non-Recurring  Standard Cost Factors Handbook (3.9%) 
Total Support Standard Cost Factors Handbook (13.8%) 
Airborne Support Equipment Standard Cost Factors Handbook (4.0%) 
Engine Support Equipment Standard Cost Factors Handbook (0.7%) 
Avionic Support Equipment Standard Cost Factors Handbook (1.7%) 
Training Equipment Standard Cost Factors Handbook (3.0%) 
Publication Standard Cost Factors Handbook (1.7%) 
Factory Parts Standard Cost Factors Handbook (0.3%) 
Miscellaneous Standard Cost Factors Handbook (2.3%) 







                     
40 Noreen Bryan, "Standard Cost Factors Handbook" (Washington, D.C.: 
Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Center for Cost Analysis, 1992). 
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3. Manufacturing 
We modeled the unit production with a notional 95 
percent learning curve.  We used the following nominal 
production schedule in Table 9, which we developed in order 
to provide a gradual integration of N-UCAS with current 
manned systems. 
Table 9.   N-UCAS Quantities in Production Lots 
Lot 1  12 
Lot 2 18 
Lot 3 24 
Lot 4 18 
Lot 5 18 
Lot 6 18 
Lot 7 18 
Lot 8 18 
Lot 9 18 
The cost for each lot was determined with the 
following equation using unit theory:41 
CT F,L =  
CT = Cost of Total Lot 
A = Cost of First Production Model (T1) 
L = Number of Last Model in Lot 
F = Number of First Model in Lot 
b = ln(0.95)/ln(2) = -0.074 
We used the analysis completed by the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Army Cost Estimating (DASA-CE) on UAV's.  
Figure 7 includes the UAV's used in the analysis and the 
data available for each of the UAV's. 
                     
41Dan Nussbaum, "Cost Estimation Methodology" (lecture, Naval 
Postgraduate School Monterey, CA, summer 2009). 
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Figure 7.   UAVs Used to Produce the Model for Estimation of the 
First Production Model by DASACE42 
The performance-based model was used to determine the 
cost, in FY03$K, of the First Production Model (T1) for N-
UCAS.  Figure 8 is the model used to estimate T1 for N-UCAS 
with the supporting statistics. 
                     
42 John Horak, Cost Performance Estimating Relationships (CPERs) for 
UAV Payloads (presentation at Department of Defense Cost and Software, 
Virginia, 2007). 
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UAV T1 (FY03$K) = 118.75 * (Endurance*Payload_Wt.)0.587 * 
e-0.010(FF_Year-1900) * e-0.921(Prod 1/0) 
 
T Statistics: (7.8) (40.2) (-1.6) (-10.8) 
Statistics adjR² = 99.4% s = 0.149 (+16.1%, -13.9%) 
(13 Data Points) (9 Degrees of Freedom) 
Where: UAV T1 = Theoretical first unit cost of UAV air 
vehicle hardware normalized for learning (95% slope) and 
rate (95% slope), via unit theory. 
In FY03 $K. 
Endurance = UAV air vehicle endurance in flight hours 
Payload_Wt. = Weight of total payload in pounds. Total 
payload includes all equipment other than the equipment 
that is necessary to fly and excludes fuel and weapons. 
FF_Year = Year of first flight Prod 1/0 = 1 if air 
vehicle is a production unit. = 0 if air vehicle is a 
development or demonstration unit. 
 
Figure 8.   Model for Cost Estimation and Statistical Data43 
Figure 9 indicates the accuracy of the best fit model 
for the aircraft used in determination of N-UCAS cost 
estimations.  The graph plots the estimated costs (FY03$K) 
of the first production models, versus the actual costs 
(FY03$K) of the first production models, for the UAVs in 
the underlying data set. 
                     
43 Horak, "Cost Performance Estimating Relationships.” 
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Figure 9.   Best Fit Model for UAV's Used by DASA-CE44 
The following data (Table 10) were used in the 
determination of T1: 
Table 10.   Data Used in Determination of T145 
Endurance in flight hours 50 
Payload Weight 8000 
Year of First Flight 2011 
Prod 1/0 1 if production unit 0 if 
demonstration unit 1 
 
Based on the model, T1 was estimated and normalized to 
FY10$ using the inflation indices published by the Navy 
Center for Cost Estimations to be $30.3M (FY10). 
The T1 calculated above of $30.3M (FY10) will be the A 
in the production model equation: 
Cost = 30.3 *Xb, where the slope is assumed to be 95% for N-
UCAS; therefore b = ln(0.95)/ln(2) = -0.074, and X is the 
Quantity produced 
                     
44 Horak, "Cost Performance Estimating Relationships”  
45 Greg Goebel, “16.0 UAVS,” In the Public Domain (January 1, 2009), 
http://www.vectorsite.net/twuav_16.html (accessed August 2009); “X-47 
Pegasus Naval Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV-N), USA” Air Force 
Technology.com, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/x47/ 
(accessed August 2009). 
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The equation used in individual units (which will then 
be aggregated into estimated costs of production lots) is: 
Cost (FY10$M) = 30.3 X-0.074 
The cost of each lot and the subsequent total cost 
normalized to FY10$K using inflation indices from the NCCA 
is in Table 11. 













D. OTHER PRODUCTION COSTS 
Other production costs were determined by multiplying 
the manufacturing costs by a cost factor from Table 8.  The 
Standard Cost Factors Handbook indicates that typically 
72.5 percent of production costs are attributed to 
manufacturing while 27.5 percent are attributed to other 
production costs.  The ratio of these two numbers shows 
that typically 38 percent of the manufacturing costs are 
analogous to the other costs.  
The summary for the production costs for N-UCAS are 
summarized in Table 12. 
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Table 12.   Production Totals for N-UCAS by Year in Millions 
of FY10$ 

























































































1. Operations and Support (O&S) 
We estimated N-UCAS O&S costs by analogy to F/A-18 E/F 
costs.  The WBS for O&S, and the FY08 costs for F/A-18 E/F, 
obtained by Navy Visibility and Management of O&S Control 
(VAMOSC) are in Table 13. 
Table 13.   O&S Data for 2008 F/A-18 E/F in FY10 Dollars46 
  F/A-18E 2008 F/A-18F 2008 
Element Level 3 FY 10 Dollars Count  FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 138,512,721   174,368,209   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 16,018,727   4,709,888   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 41,377,638   43,843,424   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 104,241,602   126,360,343   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 113,568,826   145,085,257   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 2,384,273   2,754,750   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 44,946,364   59,337,578   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 167,607   205,723   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 3,505,889   4,215,996   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 51,630   63,064   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 51,208,054   76,677,655   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 333,083   498,750   
                     
46 Data generated through Navy Visibility and Management Operating 
and Support Costs, http://www.navyvamosc.com/ (accessed September 
2009). 
 43
  F/A-18E 2008 F/A-18F 2008 
Element Level 3 FY 10 Dollars Count  FY 10 Dollars Count 
 3.4 NAPRA Costs 372,315   206,382   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 2,675,152   3,514,124   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 48,228   58,911   
 3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 2,020,121   2,467,530   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 20,360,259   36,078,197   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 44,607,966   96,641,946   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 1,669,933   2,043,114   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 2,128,890   2,223,972   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 1,985,708   2,425,496   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 74,502,496   91,003,048   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services 
(NETS) Costs 935,485   1,142,673   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services 
(CETS) Costs 1,238,164   1,512,389   
6.3 Publications Costs 311,353   380,310   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 5,378,927   6,570,233   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 2,580,509   3,152,031   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 838,438   1,129,650   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 801,194   1,663,501   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   117   125 
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   32   57 
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours—Navy   39,717   
50,59
3 
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours—Navy   6,377   
18,42
7 
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   
1,235,81
7   
1,578,
768 
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   190,349   
562,9
50 
Sum: 678,771,552   890,334,144   
 
We arranged the WBS for O&S into three categories: 
1. Manpower related 
2. Flight Hour related 
3. Number of Aircraft related 
Tables 13–15 show these categorizations.  Our 
estimation methodology assumed the following: 
1. For manpower related, we estimated N-UCAS per 
aircraft as 70 percent of the corresponding F/A 
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18s cost per aircraft, with the exception of FRS 
manpower estimates that used 50 percent.47 
2. For Flight Hour related, we estimated that the 
cost per flight hour was proportional to the cost 
per flight hour of N-UCAS. 
3. For Number of Aircraft related, we estimated that 
the cost per aircraft was proportional to the 
cost per aircraft of N-UCAS. 
The estimation also assumes that the first 12 aircraft 
will be operational for the first two years prior to 
setting up full rate production. 
Table 14.   Manpower Associated Line Items 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 
1.2.6 PCS Costs 
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 
Table 15.   Flight Hour Associated Line Items 
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 
3.4 NAPRA Cost  
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance 
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—
Navy 
 
                     
47 The estimation was used based on a 2:1 approximation of officer to 
enlisted cost.  As the automation of the vehicles increases the amount 
of human integration will be reduced.  N-UCAS sensors can be operated 
and monitored by enlisted personnel, with officers used for overall 
command and control. 
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Table 16.   Number of Aircraft Associated Line Items 
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 
6.3 Publications Costs 
 
A summary of the total F/A-18 E/F O&S costs and the 
associated calculated multipliers can be found in Table 17. 
Table 17.   Summary of F/A-18 E/F 2008 O&S Data and 
Multipliers 
F/A-18 E/F 2008 
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Multiple 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 312880930 0.002
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 20728615 0.002
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 85221062 0.002
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 230601945 2003.248
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 258654083 72.49509
1.2.6 PCS Costs 5139023 0.002
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 104283942 0.002
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 373330 0.002
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 7721885 67.08033
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 114694 0.996351
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 127885709 1110.948
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 831833 7.226167
3.4 NAPRA Costs 578697 5.027164
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 6189276 53.76649
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 107139 0.930721
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 4487651 38.98441
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 56438456 0.002
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 141249912 0.002
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 3713047 11217.66
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 4352862 0.0015
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 4411204 13326.9
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 165505544 500016.7
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 2078158 6278.423
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 2750553 8309.828
6.3 Publications Costs 691663 2089.616
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 11949160 103.8028
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 5732540 49.79881
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F/A-18 E/F 2008 
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Multiple 
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular – Navy 1968088 17.09686
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS – Navy 2464695 0.0015
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   242
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   89
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   90310
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   24804
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed – Navy   2814585
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed – Navy   753299
Sum: 1.57 Billion Dollars   
 
Tables 18 through 27 summarize the O&S costs by line 
item for N-UCAS from 2013 through 2022. 
Table 18.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2013 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2013   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 7940180.701   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 526043.4018   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 2162709.731   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 8360191.36   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 9377187.299   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 130416.2937   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 2646480.703   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 9474.23565   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 279947.4924   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 4158.090634   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 4636339.903   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 30157.08761   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 20979.95166   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 224384.6284   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 3884.193353   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 162694.2961   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 1432275.016   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 3584589.912   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 134611.9758   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 78903.8429   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 159922.8036   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 6000200.991   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 75341.07553   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 99717.93353   
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N-UCAS 2013   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
6.3 Publications Costs 25075.39577   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 1245.634067   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 597.5856977   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 205.162326   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 44677.25076   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   12
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4173.317
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   129349.3
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 48.15 Million Dollars   
 
Table 19.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2014 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2014   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 7940180.701   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 526043.4018   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 2162709.731   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 8360191.36   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 9377187.299   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 130416.2937   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 2646480.703   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 9474.23565   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 279947.4924   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 4158.090634   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 4636339.903   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 30157.08761   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 20979.95166   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 224384.6284   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 3884.193353   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 162694.2961   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 1432275.016   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 3584589.912   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 134611.9758   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 78903.8429   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 159922.8036   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 6000200.991   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 75341.07553   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 99717.93353   
6.3 Publications Costs 25075.39577   
 48
N-UCAS 2014   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 1245.634067   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 597.5856977   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 205.162326   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 44677.25076   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   12
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4173.317
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   129349.3
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 48.15 Million Dollars   
 
Table 20.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2015 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2015   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 19850451.75   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 1315108.505   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 5406774.326   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 20900478.4   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 23442968.25   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 326040.7341   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 6616201.758   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 23685.58912   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 699868.7311   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 10395.22659   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 11590849.76   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 75392.71903   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 52449.87915   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 560961.571   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 9710.483384   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 406735.7402   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 3580687.541   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 8961474.779   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 134611.9758   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 197259.6073   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 399807.0091   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 15000502.48   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 188352.6888   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 249294.8338   
6.3 Publications Costs 62688.48943   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 3114.085168   
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N-UCAS 2015   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 1493.964244   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 512.9058151   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 111693.1269   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   30
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   10433.29
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   323373.2
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 120.2 Million Dollars   
 
Table 21.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2016 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2016   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 35730813.15   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 2367195.308   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 9732193.787   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 37620861.12   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 42197342.85   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 586873.3215   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 11909163.16   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 42634.06042   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 1259763.716   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 18711.40785   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 20863529.56   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 135706.8943   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 94409.78248   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 1009730.828   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 17478.87009   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 732124.3323   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 6445237.573   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 16130654.6   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 201917.9637   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 355067.2931   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 719652.6163   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 27000904.46   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 339034.8399   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 448730.7009   
6.3 Publications Costs 112839.281   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 5605.353302   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 2689.135639   
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N-UCAS 2016   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 923.2304672   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 201047.6284   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   54
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   18779.93
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   582071.7
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 216.3 Million Dollars   
 
Table 22.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2017 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2017   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 47641084.21   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 3156260.411   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 12976258.38   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 50161148.16   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 56263123.79   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 782497.7619   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 15878884.22   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 56845.4139   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 1679684.955   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 24948.54381   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 27818039.42   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 180942.5257   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 125879.71   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 1346307.77   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 23305.16012   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 976165.7764   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 8593650.098   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 21507539.47   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 269223.9517   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 473423.0574   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 959536.8218   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 36001205.95   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 452046.4532   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 598307.6012   
6.3 Publications Costs 150452.3746   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 7473.804403   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 3585.514186   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 1230.973956   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 268063.5045   
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N-UCAS 2017   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   72
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   25039.9
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   776095.6
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 288.4 Million Dollars   
 
Table 23.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2017 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2018   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 59551355.26   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 3945325.514   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 16220322.98   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 62701435.2   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 70328904.74   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 978122.2024   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 19848605.27   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 71056.76737   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 2099606.193   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 31185.67976   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 34772549.27   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 226178.1571   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 157349.6375   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 1682884.713   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 29131.45015   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 1220207.221   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 10742062.62   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 26884424.34   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 336529.9396   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 591778.8218   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 1199421.027   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 45001507.43   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 565058.0665   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 747884.5015   
6.3 Publications Costs 188065.4683   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 9342.255503   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 4481.892732   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 1538.717445   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 335079.3807   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   90
 52
N-UCAS 2018   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   31299.88
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   970119.5
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 360.5 Million Dollars   
 
Table 24.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2019 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2019   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 71461626.31   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 4734390.616   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 19464387.57   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 75241722.24   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 84394685.69   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 1173746.643   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 23818326.33   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 85268.12085   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 2519527.432   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 37422.81571   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 41727059.13   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 271413.7885   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 188819.565   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 2019461.656   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 34957.74018   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 1464248.665   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 12890475.15   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 32261309.21   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 403835.9275   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 710134.5861   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 1439305.233   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 54001808.92   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 678069.6798   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 897461.4018   
6.3 Publications Costs 225678.5619   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 11210.7066   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 5378.271279   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 1846.460934   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 402095.2568   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   108
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   37559.85
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N-UCAS 2019   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   1164143
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 432.6 Million Dollars   
 
Table 25.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2020 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2020   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 83371897.36   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 5523455.719   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 22708452.17   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 87782009.27   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 98460466.64   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 1369371.083   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 27788047.38   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 99479.47432   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 2939448.671   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 43659.95166   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 48681568.98   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 316649.4199   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 220289.4924   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 2356038.598   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 40784.03021   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 1708290.109   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 15038887.67   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 37638194.07   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 471141.9154   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 828490.3505   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 1679189.438   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 63002110.4   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 791081.2931   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 1047038.302   
6.3 Publications Costs 263291.6556   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 13079.1577   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 6274.649825   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 2154.204423   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 469111.1329   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   126
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   43819.83
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
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N-UCAS 2020   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   1358167
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 504.7 Million Dollars   
 
Table 26.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2021 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2021   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 95282168.41   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 6312520.822   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 25952516.77   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 100322296.3   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 112526247.6   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 1564995.524   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 31757768.44   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 113690.8278   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 3359369.909   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 49897.08761   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 55636078.84   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 361885.0514   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 251759.4199   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 2692615.541   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 46610.32024   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 1952331.553   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 17187300.2   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 43015078.94   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 538447.9033   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 946846.1148   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 1919073.644   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 72002411.89   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 904092.9063   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 1196615.202   
6.3 Publications Costs 300904.7492   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 14947.60881   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 7171.028372   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 2461.947913   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 536127.0091   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   144
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   50079.81
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   1552191
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N-UCAS 2021   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
Sum: 576.8 Million Dollars   
 
Table 27.   O&S Data for N-UCAS 2022 in FY10 Dollars 
N-UCAS 2022   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
1.1.1 Organizational Regular Military Personnel Costs 107192439.5   
1.2.2 Training Expendable Stores Costs 7101585.924   
1.2.3 Support Supplies Costs 29196581.36   
1.2.4 AVDLR Costs Total Regular 112862583.4   
1.2.5 Fuel Costs 126592028.5   
1.2.6 PCS Costs 1760619.964   
2.1.1 Intermediate Military Personnel Costs 35727489.49   
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 127902.1813   
3.1.1 Organic Aircraft Rework Costs 3779291.148   
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs 56134.22356   
3.3.1 Organic Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 62590588.69   
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs 407120.6828   
3.4 NAPRA Costs 283229.3474   
3.6.1 Organic Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 3029192.483   
3.6.2 Commercial Aircraft Emergency Repair Costs 52436.61027   
3.8 Support Equipment Maintenance Costs 2196372.997   
4.1.1 Subtotal Organizational FRS Personnel Costs 19335712.72   
4.1.2 Subtotal FRS Operations Costs 48391963.81   
4.2.1 Operational Training Costs 605753.8912   
4.2.2 Maintenance Training Costs 1065201.879   
5.1.2 Modification Spares Costs 2158957.849   
5.1.4 Modification Kits and Installation Costs 81002713.38   
6.1 Navy Engineering and Technical Services (NETS) Costs 1017104.52   
6.2 Contractor Engineering and Technical Services (CETS) 
Costs 1346192.103   
6.3 Publications Costs 338517.8429   
6.4.1 Program Related Logistics Costs 16816.05991   
6.4.2 Program Related Engineering Costs 8067.406918   
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—Regular—Navy 2769.691402   
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs—FRS—Navy 603142.8852   
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   162
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   0
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   56339.78
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   0
A5.1.1 Regular Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   1746215 
A5.2.1 FRS Barrels of Fuel Consumed—Navy   0
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N-UCAS 2022   
Element Level 3 Constant FY 10 Dollars Count 
Sum: 648.9 Million Dollars   
 
Table 28 summarizes the O&S costs for N-UCAS through 
the end of production in 2022. 

























Total O&S  48 48 120 216 288 360 433 505 577 649 
O&S COST 
per Unit 
(N-UCAS) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 
E. SUMMARY 
Table 29 summarizes the N-UCAS LCCE, in FY10$M through 
FY42, which is 20 past the end of the production phase.  
Each of the 20-out years was estimated using the FY22 O&S 
data. 
Table 29.   LCC for N-UCAS in Millions of FY10$ 
Total RDT&E Costs FY10$ 
in millions 1468.23 
Total Production Costs 
in FY10$ in millions 5012.48 
Total O&S Costs in FY10$
in millions 16224.44 




V. COST ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this section, we analyzed the funding stream for N-
UCAS through the entire production phase (FY13-FY22) by 
comparing it to the O&S of two aircraft carriers and their 
associated air wings.  Two aircraft carriers and their 
associated air wings were chosen based on the constraining 
capacity of warhead tonnage on target (strike mission 
availability).  This thesis approximated (as calculated in 
Chapter III) that an 18 N-UCAS addition to an aircraft 
carrier (six organic N-UCAS plus 12 land-based) can deliver 
the same warheads on targets as an additional strike air 
wing.  This allows nine aircraft carriers to deliver the 
same amount of warhead tonnage as approximately 13 
carriers.  All other mission sets as outlined in Table 3 
will be enhanced per Chapter III. 
B. CARRIER AND AIR WING O&S 
The class average for all CVNs O&S data was combined 
with the O&S data for the aircraft in the air wing.  E-2C 
O&S data were used to approximate E-2D O&S, and Super 
Hornet data were used to approximate Growler and JSF O&S.  
Table 30 summarizes the O&S data for the complete air wing 
and carrier.  The total was multiplied by two (to 
illustrate a reduction of two aircraft carriers) to show 
the total savings by reducing the carrier fleet to nine 
carriers.   
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Table 30.   O&S Summary for One Equivalent Air Wing and 
Carrier48 
O&S 2008 in millions of FY10$ Per Unit 
Total per Air 
Wing   
Total 
Cost 
454.66 CVN-65CL       
403.09 CVN-68CL       
428.88 
Average CVN 
O&S  1   428.88 
7.90 E-2C 5   39.50 
4.56 FA-18E       
4.89 FA-18F       
4.72 Average FA-18 24   113.37 
4.72 JSF 24   113.37 
4.72 Growler 5   23.62 
   Total 718.74 
   2 Carriers 1437.47 
C. COST COMPARISON 
Table 31 illustrates that if the reduction in the 
carrier fleet can be accomplished by 2013, cost savings 
will be realized.49  In 2022, once production is complete, 
the O&S costs for the entire N-UCAS complement will be less 





                     
48 Navy Visibility and Management Operating and Support Costs, 
http://www.navyvamosc.com (accessed October 2009). 
49 A reduction in one aircraft carrier will yield comparable savings 
to the increase in funding requirements from N-UCAS. 
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Table 31.   O&S Funding for Two Air Wings and Carriers vs. 
























Total O&S  48 48 120 216 288 360 433 505 577 649 
Total 
Production 450 601 761 553 543 535 528 523 518   
Total 
RDT&E  158                   
Total 






Fleet 1437 1437 1437 1437 1437 1437 1437 1437 1437 1437
Change in 
Funding -781 -788 -557 -668 -606 -542 -477 -410 -343 -789
The computations above show that the LCCE developed in 
this thesis implies an overall savings in Navy Funding 
Requirements. To test the robustness of these savings, we 
increased “other production-costs.”  Originally, these 
costs were estimated as a factor of manufacturing costs, so 
we increased the factor to 100 percent (thereby doubling 
other production-costs to equal manufacturing costs), which 
still returned a cost savings in funding requirements. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In addition to increasing the capacity for strike of a 
single air wing, N-UCAS will increase the carrier's 
capability to perform long-distance persistent strike.  The 
Life Cycle Cost estimation demonstrates a reduction in 
spending through 2022.  Also, the O&S data for the rest of 
the CSG (destroyers, cruisers, and submarines) while it is 
deployed with a carrier were not included.  These costs are 
summarized in Table 32.  
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Table 32.   O&S Costs associated with Cruisers, Destroyers, 
and Submarines for 2008 in Millions of FY10$50 
Ship Class 






Total for Two of each Ship for Six Months 148.4 
 
Although the costs in Table 32 will not be saved by 
reducing the carrier fleet, the O&S costs can be spent on 
mission sets other than the protection of the carrier 
fleet.   
 
                     




The addition of N-UCAS to the fleet will add the 
capability of long-range persistent strike.  The current 
capability is limited by the flight hours a human can spend 
in the aircraft, while N-UCAS will increase flight hours to 
50 hours.  The 50–hour flight time, coupled with the long 
unrefueled ranges, will enable the fleet to meet the strike 
needs of the military in a surface denied domain.   
B. CAPACITY 
N-UCAS will allow the fleet to meet the constraining 
requirement of strike missions (warheads on targets) with 
nine aircraft carriers.  The nine aircraft carriers with N-
UCAS will deliver the equivalent of approximately 13 strike 
carriers (measured in warhead tonnage on target).  The 
addition of the N-UCAS will increase the capacity of the 
fleet to perform all other mission sets, while reducing the 
cost to the military and allowing the opportunity to fund 
the MSCE portion of the fleet. 
C. LCC ESTIMATION 
The LCC show that the addition of N-UCAS will reduce 
cost to the Navy through FY22, if the aircraft carrier 
fleet is reduced to nine carriers.  Although the carrier 
fleet is reduced, the destroyers, cruisers, and submarine 
associated with CSGs will be able to accomplish other 
missions such as MSCE, partnership building, strike, ASW, 
and ISR.  Not only will these ships be able to accomplish 
MSCE and partnership building, but the reduction in funding 
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provides resources to fund an increase in procurement for 
smaller ships better suited for partnership building and 
maritime security. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The addition of N-UCAS will increase the fleet's 
capacities and capabilities.  N-UCAS can be added to the 
fleet, giving an organic UAV capability to the carrier, 
while increasing power projection capacity and allowing for 
the reduction in the carrier fleet.  The reduction in the 
carrier fleet will not reduce the capacity to perform any 
military functions—specifically the carrier fleet will be 
able to perform more ISR, strike, and close-in-air support 
than the current fleet.   
The LCC estimation of N-UCAS illustrates that the Navy 
can fund the project with cost savings from the reduction 
in O&S costs associated with two aircraft carriers.  This 
thesis has not analyzed the risks associated with reducing 
the carrier fleet associated with less presence, but the 
cost savings can be used to fund additional LCS and HSVs, 





This thesis has demonstrated that the capabilities of 
the carrier fleet could be increased with the addition of 
N-UCAS, which support long-range persistent strike and ISR.  
With the addition of N-UCAS the capability and capacity of 
today's carrier fleet can be met with nine carriers.  The 
carrier fleet is used as a show of force and Sea Control in 
the global commons, but the reduction in large expensive 
carriers will allow for funding of LCS and HSV type vessels 
that will aid in partnership building and maritime 
security.  Further study is recommended in the following 
areas: 
 An analysis of the addition of directed energy 
and lasers to N-UCAS to increase the strike 
capacity. 
 The integration of unmanned underwater vehicles 
to aid in targeting and ISR for surface denied 
environments. 
 LCC estimations for integration of N-UCAS into 
the EW and AEW air wings. 
 Sensitivity Analysis of the number of carriers in 
the fleet to include: 
 Threat Analysis. 
 Cost Analysis of a brown and green water 
fleet. 
 Building a new class of ship that is designed for 
unmanned vehicles as opposed to building unmanned 
vehicles to fit the current vessels. 
 An analysis of manpower requirements for N-UCAS 
integration. 
 Cost Estimations for the O&S data expended for 
other ships that are included in the CSG.   
 64
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 65
APPENDIX A. ASSUMPTIONS 
 
1.  N-UCAS will have self protection in the form of lasers 
or directed energy by 2030. 
 
2.  JSF and Super Hornet 8000lb payload based on total 
20,000lb payload.  They must carry air-to-air missiles and 
external fuel bladders to perform mission sets as 
discussed. 
 
3.  Interdiction and fleet air defense (air-to-air combat) 
is conducted by manned fighters. 
 
4.  JSF and Super Hornet lose stealth when loaded with 
external payloads. 
 
5.  N-UCAS can be equipped with payloads equivalent to the 
capabilities of the E-2D and the Growler, with the 
exception of the supersonic speed of the Growler.  (Not 
used for cost estimations) 
 
6.  Once the target location is outside 400nm from the 
aircraft carrier, Air Force support is needed to keep the 
aerial tanker within 200nm of the target.  This could place 
the tanker in the threat envelope. 
 
7.  The aircraft speed to and from the target to the 
carrier and to and from the tanker is maximum aircraft 
speed.  (After burner not analyzed). 
 
8.  Loiter times over target are calculated using an 
approach speed of 125kts. 
 
9.  Manned aircraft are limited to 10-hour flights due to 
human restrictions. 
 
10.  Tanking time is approximated at 20 minutes for 
rendezvous, loiter, approach, and tanking. 
 
11.  The aircraft tank after launch and before return so 
the missions are started with full tanks. 
 
12.  Fuel burn rates were not increased for operation with 
after burner. 
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APPENDIX B. CALCULATIONS 
1.  Distance from carrier to target is 0 to 3000nm. 
 
2.   
 
3.  : Until 








Total Flight Time is 50 hours for N-UCAS and 10 hours for 
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